We consider a policy reform relaxing price controls in American pari-mutuel wagering on horse racing by examining bookie behavior in Australia's fixed-odds gambling sector. Descriptive regressions indicate that bookie takeouts (the effective prices of races) vary substantially and systematically with race characteristics, though in sometimes counterintuitive ways. Estimates of an explicitly reduced form model of bookie takeout, however, qualitatively match both intuition and prior findings in the literature. Calibration using these estimates suggests that regulatory reform that permits racecourses to alter takeout across races would increase variable profit by 3-6%.
permanent (Hialeah, FL, 2010 ; Tioga Downs, NY, 2010) reductions, but results have thus far been inconclusive. 1 Such regulatory changes and experiments did not permit racetracks to engage in price discrimination by actively adjusting the takeout across races. Bettor demand may be such that varying takeout across races, rather than simply selecting a fixed level of takeout, is another important margin of deregulation. Schmalensee (1981) admittedly shows that price discrimination by a monopolist that does not increase quantity sold will increase revenues but decrease welfare. Because states typically levy excise taxes on wagering, though, shifting to taxes on cumulative takeout and allowing such price discrimination would increase tax revenues and may allow the reduction of more egregiously welfare-harming taxes. It is therefore possible that welfare would rise from such a policy change. Both regulatory issues of takeout level and variability have been prominent in industry suggestions (NRTA Player
Panel Recommendations, 2004) . Furthermore, the industry's ongoing financial troubles from increased gambling competition and the recent recession have focused both regulators and racetracks on ways to improve the industry's viability.
We have no data from U.S. racetracks and such regulatory changes, but we instead observe bookies from Australian fixed-odds thoroughbred horse race wagering. Bookies in this context set the takeout implicitly by selecting the level of odds on the field of horses, and their behavior therefore may be indicative of what a profit-maximizing racetrack would do if permitted to set and vary its own takeout. Such a comparison hinges on the similarity between bettors in the two countries. Australians appear to gamble substantially more than Americans, with Australian per capita losses at least triple those in the U.S. 2 This gap, though, presumably stems at least in part from the comparatively easy access to gambling in Australia rather than radically different consumer preferences. Moreover, the countries' common heritages and other resemblances suggest that the comparison may be apt. To the extent that Australian and American bettors share preferences over race characteristics and disutility on money spent, our results can shed light on the revenue and welfare impacts for certain U.S. reforms.
Previous researchers have used variation in takeout rates and amounts wagered to estimate price-elasticities for U.S. pari-mutuel gambling (Gruen, 1976; Suits, 1979; Mobilia, 1993; Thalheimer and Ali, 1998; Gramm et al., 2007) . These studies have generally found 1 Laurel Park halved its takeouts across the board for ten days in August 2007. Hialeah Park lowered its takeout to 12% for all bet-types in October 2010. Tioga Downs reduced all its takeouts to the state minima (15% for win/place/show bets) for the 2010 season and maintained those lower levels for the 2011 season.
2 "The world's 10 biggest gambling nations -including Canada", Vancouver Sun, 7/11/2011, data taken from H2 Gambling Capital. that takeout rates are higher than the revenue-maximizing level, with point estimates of own-takeout elasticities ranging from -1.6 to -3. To our knowledge, no studies have considered how race characteristics themselves can affect these price-elasticities. This is exactly the information that the estimates of our reduced form model provide. When combined with plausible estimates of own-price demand parameters, these estimates allow for the identification of the full set of structural parameters and can therefore predict the impacts of different policy recommendations. We need race-level characteristics to employ this analysis, and we lean heavily on Coffey and Maloney (2010, henceforth CM) to do so. While that paper uses data from Churchill Downs (KY) in 1994 to distinguish the incentive effect from selection in explaining the correlation between performance and reward, it also includes regression results that show the impact of race characteristics on the amount of money wagered, known in the U.S. as handle and in Australia as turnover. CM find that handle increases in field size (i.e., number of horses) and purse and decreases in dispersion of horse-talent. It is those regression results (with CM's summary statistics) that we will combine with the Kentucky-specific price elasticity estimate from Thalheimer and Ali (1998) in our calibration exercise.
While we build on the above literature, our research is superficially most similar to the work of Shin (1993) in that we both use the bookmaker's implied takeout as the dependent variable and employ race characteristics such as size of field and dispersion of horse-talent as explanatory variables. Shin (1993) , though, frames his empirical exercise as identifying the prevalence of insider trading, which he posits is the cause of the recurrently observed favoritelongshot bias in which favorites are underbet and longshots are overbet. 3 Our approach, on the other hand, begins with descriptive regressions and then turns to estimating a reduced form model that is explicitly derived from a structural model. While the estimates from the descriptive regression are more useful for predicting the equilibrium impacts of race characteristics on takeout, the reduced form estimates illuminate the mechanisms by which those impacts arise.
We begin by showing the extent of variation in our observed bookie takeout rates. Even on the same day and at the same racetrack, the sample standard deviation for takeout is three percentage points (compared to a mean of seventeen percentage points). Our descriptive 3 Broadly speaking, bookies in Shin's model protect themselves from bettors with inside information on longshots by offering less favorable odds on those horses than objective probabilities would suggest. Cain et al. (2003) provide additional empirical support consistent with the thesis. Working against the primacy of this interpretation, recent research has looked to explain the observed longshot bias in pari-mutuel gambling as the result of bettor misperception (Sobel and Raines, 2003; Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010) or sequential information release (Ottaviani and Sorenson, 2009). results linking bookie takeout rates with race characteristics are generally as expected, in that these takeouts are higher for races with more ex ante even fields, for races with larger fields, and for late-day races. The inclusion of a race's purse (prize money to top finishers) as a proxy for a race's unobserved prestige and quality, though, yields a surprising result: observed takeouts are lower for higher purse races. As we find no anecdotal support for the idea that competition is greater for these races, this apparent demand anomaly is analogous to the common observation that many items go on sale during periods of high demand.
Explanations for this curious pricing pattern have often centered on an item being a lossleader (e.g., Chevalier et al., 2003) , but Nevo and Hatzitaskos (2005) offer a novel if more prosaic explanation that we follow. If high demand periods are characterized not only by an outward shift of demand but also by an increase in demand elasticity, then firms with market power may respond to the increased elasticity by lowering markups. Likewise, if higher purse races attract more elastic bettors, then profit maximizing bookies will respond by lowering their implied takeout rates. 4 The structural model from which we derive our reduced form model allows for just this sort of demand rotation. The resulting estimates indicate that the model reconciles the observed negative correlation of purse and takeout with the expectation that bettor demand should be higher for higher purse races by letting the slope of the bookie's residual demand become flatter.
The reduced form parameter estimates are insufficient to conduct any policy experiments, as most estimates are only identified up to scale. We return to our originally posited representative bettor and calibrate the price-disutility parameter from a previously estimated own-take elasticity for Kentucky and average race characteristics from Churchill Downs, thereby identifying all parameters of the structural model. Using these parameters, we back out what bookie variable profits and welfare would have been under hypothetical regulatory regimes. These results indicate that restricting Australian bookies to common takeout rates (instead of the observed variable rates) would have reduced bookie variable profits by 3-6%.
This compares to the 7.7% increase in variable profits that our preferred elasticity measure suggests would occur if Kentucky regulators reduced racecourse takeout for win bets from 16% to 14%.
We next lay out the institutions of pari-mutuel wagering on horseracing in the U.S.
and the hybrid wagering of Australia that allows both pari-mutuel and fixed-odds bets. A simple model links a bookie's observed odds to the implied takeout rate, which becomes our primary variable of interest. We introduce our model of a representative bettor's demand for horserace wagering and consider the equilibrium supply-side relationships between implied takeout rates and race characteristics. After discussing the data, we estimate descriptive and reduced form regressions, and we close with a discussion of our results from the calibration exercise.
1 Background
Institutions: American and Australian
Horse race gambling in the U.S. uses the pari-mutuel format exclusively. 5 Takeout rates in the US tend to be set directly by state government or by the state's regulatory body over gambling, though some states offer racetracks limited discretion. In the pari-mutuel format, bettors make wagers on horses in the time leading up to the race, but, as posted odds are preliminary, these wagers are for an unspecified price. Payouts are based on final odds and depend on how the handle is distributed across the field of horses at race time. For simple bets (such as the win-bets that we observe in our Australian data), the racetrack subtracts a percentage equal to the takeout and then returns the remaining money to the bettors who placed wagers on the winning horse proportionally to the amounts wagered. Odds for any given race are therefore determined entirely by how bettors decide to wager. These wagers can be made at the racetrack or at off-track betting facilities. 8 5 After gambling was prohibited in almost all American states in the early 20th century, racetrack-operated pari-mutuel wagering on horse races was reintroduced in many revenue-starved states during the Depression, with the new condition that excise taxes were placed on handle. 6 New York, for example, mandates minimum takeout rates of 15% for win/place/show bets, though it appears that only Tioga Downs since its recent reduction is presently at those minima. 7 Churchill Downs 2009 annual report, p. 48. 8 The Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-515) stipulates that off-track betting facilities are subject to the same regulations regarding takeout as the racetracks themselves and that such facilities Fixed odds gambling in horse racing (as can be found in Australia, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and several other countries) differs from pari-mutuel wagering in several ways. The most prominent distinction is the existence of the bookmaker, an individual who is actively setting odds. As the format's name implies, odds offered to a bettor are fixed, though these odds may be changed for subsequent bettors. Foremost to this analysis, the takeout (the expected percentage of the last dollar bet that is kept by the bookie) is implicitly determined by the set of odds chosen by the bookmaker and thus can vary across time, racetracks and races.
Australia, like its Imperial kin, allows gambling using both a fixed odds format and a pari-mutuel format. There are 379 racetracks in Australia, though only 17 are considered large. Major racetracks in the same city rarely operate on the same day. 9 While Saturday races tend to draw the largest crowds, Wednesday and Friday (midweek) races are also held.
A number of independent bookmakers (typically 20-40) at these racecourses compete for bettor business against one another, against the on-site pari-mutuel system, and against all off-site gambling options. Each bookmaker should be thought of as a three-person team consisting of the bookie, the penciler (who records odds), and the ledger (who records bettors' wagers). Depending on the state, the pari-mutuel system is either state-run or operated under substantial regulation by a for-profit firm. The pari-mutuel takeout rate in New South Wales (Sydney) and Victoria (Melbourne) varies by bet type; the pari-mutuel takeout rate for straight win bets is 14.5% in both cities. Pari-mutuel takeout in Queensland (Brisbane)
is regulated differently in that the blended takeout (weighted average of simple and exotic bet takeouts) cannot exceed 16% over a twelve-month period and no takeout rate can exceed 25%.
The horses that are slated to race are known in advance of race day. Opening odds from the bookmakers are posted approximately 30 minutes before race time, and changes to these odds are periodically made prior to the posting of the official starting prices. As shown in
McAlvanah and Moul (2011), the takeouts implied by these fixed odds start out relatively high (∼30%) and tend to fall as the race approaches. This decline occurs as the risk to the bookie of a bettor with inside information falls and as the value to the bettor of fixed odds wagers relative to pari-mutuel wagers becomes smaller. In the data and throughout this paper, a wager's gross odds is the amount for each dollar wagered that is returned to the bettor in the event of his horse winning. For example, a $1 wager on a winning horse with be at least 60 miles from the nearest racetrack. 9 In our sample, two racetracks in the same city are open on only 2 of our 241 Saturdays.
listed odds of 4 would pay back $4 (the original $1 plus the $3 of winnings). The price of a wager is the reciprocal of those odds, and so the above wager would have a price of 0.25.
Two commonly used measures of bookies' profit potential are the margin and takeout. 10 The margin  is defined as the amount of a marginal dollar wagered that is retained by the bookie as a proportion of the amount returned to bettors. The takeout  is defined as the amount of a marginal dollar wagered that is retained by the bookie as a fraction of the total amount wagered. For example, a 25% margin corresponds to the bookie retaining 20% of the total amount wagered as takeout and paying out 80%. The connecting formulae between margin and takeout are thus  =  +1
and  =  1− . Both the margin and takeout should be weakly positive, else there exists an arbitrage opportunity. While bookie margin has instructive parallels with Arrow-Debreu prices that sum to more than one as bookies impose the equivalent of a tax, we prefer the implied takeout in order to facilitate comparisons with the competing and American pari-mutuel regimes. All of our empirical results are robust to employing bookie margin instead of implied takeout rates as the dependent variable.
Transforming observed odds into implied takeout
We now detail assumptions under which the bookmaker's expected takeout for a race can be constructed from a set of observed odds. We assume that bettors obtain sufficiently high recreational utility from gambling as to always wager on a race and that they decide on which horse to bet on the basis of the expected monetary payoff, assuming risk neutrality.
Our model of bettors is thus a special case of Ottaviani and Sorensen (2010) without private bettor information so that bettors share common beliefs about race outcomes. Imperfectly competitive bookmakers set odds   , the gross payout to a winner of a $1 wager on horse k winning the race. Let   denote the bookie's subjective probability of horse k winning the race. The expected takeout on horse k is thus   = 1 −     . In expectation, the bookie retains   of every dollar wagered on horse k and pays out     . Let   denote a bettor's subjective probability of horse  winning the race. Bettor equilibrium conditions imply that a bettor is indifferent between a wager on any two horses:     =     ∀ . These conditions also correspond to the bookie maintaining a balanced book, where the bookie is guaranteed a riskless return. When combined with the fact that subjective probabilities sum to one
, our system contains K equations for K horses. For a given set of observed odds in equilibrium, one can uniquely determine the bettor subjective probabilities:
Note that the converse is not true, as bettor subjective probabilities do not correspond to a unique set of odds. Bettor subjective probabilities determine only the ratio of odds; for example,
, and
for a three-horse race. The bookie has the capacity to fix the magnitude of the odds for any one horse and thus implicitly the takeout for the race.
Consider the following simple three-horse race example. Substituting
into the consumer indifference conditions yields
and
, which simplifies
. As before, we have more unknowns than equations, and horse-level takeouts are not uniquely identified by the subjective probabilities. Without loss of generality, assume the bookie sets the odds on horse 1 and thus determines  1 . The consumer indifference conditions then imply that
These equations indicate that a bookie maintaining a balanced book cannot set individual horse-level takeouts independently of each other, due to the inter-linking of odds imposed by the bettor equilibrium conditions. The expected race-level takeout would thus appear to depend on   ,   , and   for all k.
The expected race takeout is then the sum of individual horse-level takeouts, weighted by each horse's fraction of the total amount wagered. In the general case in which bookie and bettor subjective probabilities may not coincide, we follow the pari-mutuel system and assume that the fraction wagered on a particular horse coincides with bettor subjective probability for that horse, so that  = P     . Substituting   = 1 −     and our prior expression for equilibrium subjective probabilities as the relative share of summed reciprocal odds yields the formula for takeout:
Alternatively, the race-margin is given by
Intuitively, the extent to which the reciprocal gross odds (i.e., the wagers' prices) sum to greater than one signifies bookie's expected profit margin.
We now link the race takeout  (and implicitly the margin) to the bookmaker's presumed objective function of expected profits. Let Λ  denote the number of dollars wagered on horse k, and let  denote the total amount wagered on a race with a bookmaker. The expected profit for the race will then be  () = P  Λ    . Using the prior assumption that the amount of money wagered on a particular horse as a share of the total amount wagered coincides with bettor subjective probability on that horse (i.e.,
If the total amount wagered depends on the takeout so that ( ), then the bookie chooses the level of odds and implicitly the takeout to maximize ( ) *  . The bookie's problem is thus analogous to a revenue-maximizing firm facing a downward-sloping demand curve.
Model
We begin by considering the most general case of our bookie's profit-maximization problem.
Bookmakers choose their margin (and implicitly their takeouts) to maximize their expected profits conditional on having a balanced book. Letting  denote the relevant residual demand for win bets, the first order condition for the profit maximization problem is
If race characteristics  are exogenous to the bookmaker, then appealing to the Implicit Function Theorem yields the comparative statics of race characteristics on bookmaker take at the optimum.
The denominator is negative by necessity to ensure a maximum. The sign of
 
(that is, the sign of a coefficient in our descriptive regressions) then depends on the sign of
If the impact of  on the slope of the demand of betting is insignificant (i.e., We posit a representative bettor who has a linear demand for race-time win-bets. 11 Let   denote this demand in AUD$ wagered in racetrack i, race k, and period t:
In the above,  denotes race takeout (the price of wagering on the race).  denotes a matrix of race characteristics that shift demand, and  (a subset of ) denotes a matrix of characteristics that rotate demand. We allow for two unobserved disturbances ( and ); the former captures ex ante determined characteristics that may influence the number and quality of horses in the field, and the latter captures ex post characteristics. Respective examples for the two are the race's prestige and weather on the day of the race. This framework introduces the obvious concern of omitted variable bias, as higher prestige races may generate larger and more even fields and the econometrician would then be unable to distinguish bettors' preferences on the race's prestige from other observed race characteristics. While bettors are unlikely to care directly about a race's purse, purse and prestige are presumably highly positively correlated. We therefore address this concern by using race-purse as a proxy for race-prestige (  =       ) and henceforth subsume purse into our  and  matrices.
The aggregated demands for win-bets can be found by multiplying this representative consumer's demand by some fraction  of racetrack i's market population for period t
Let  denote this aggregated demand:
As Louisville has a single major thoroughbred racecourse (Churchill Downs) which only permits pari-mutuel betting and has no off-track betting facilities nearby, we assume that  = 1 in that case. This demand specification is exactly our endgoal for that market, and we will employ it when calibrating against the Thalheimer and Ali (1998) own-take elasticity estimate and the CM summary statistics. Australian betting and its consequent demand estimates differ in that bettor demand in Australia is divided between pari-mutuel wagering and fixed-odds wagering and between on-track and off-track wagering. Using data from the Australian Racing Book (2008) and assuming that tracks do not serve as same-day competitors to each other, we set  = 0084.
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We will further assume that our observed bookmaker at racecourse i in period t is one of   bookies. As the summary statistics will show, the observed bookie takeouts are quite similar to the pari-mutuel takeouts for the racetrack's state for Sydney and Melbourne and higher than the pari-mutuel takeout in Brisbane. When combined with the observation that racetracks have many (at least 20 and up to 45) bookies, this suggests that bookies engage in (perhaps tacit) collusion rather than imperfect competition. 13 We estimated our model under the differing assumptions of perfect cartel behavior and symmetric Cournot behavior, and the levels of demand that would rationalize observed takeouts under the Cournot assumption were implausible (e.g., each bookie-team capturing AUD$72,000 in a eight-race Saturday).
This is driven by observed bookie takeouts being so close to the pari-mutuel takeout and the assumption that pari-mutuel takeout is either at or above the revenue-maximizing level.
We therefore maintain the hypothesis that our sampled bookie is part of a cartel and limit our theoretical discussion to that case. The bookie's residual demand is thus his share of the market demand.
Our demand specification in (6) then implies inverse demand of
Our bookie maximizes revenue by setting odds that imply a takeout of
This is the standard result of revenue-maximization under linear demand, where a monopolist will optimally choose a price equal to half of demand's vertical intercept (choke-price).
Our reduced form can therefore identify the structural parameters that are interacted with takeout (i.e., demand rotating s) but demand shifting s are identified only up to scale:
. Note that neither the population-weighting parameter  nor the population variable appears in this pricing equation; they will arise only in our cross-country calibration exercise. Residuals will be heteroskedastic by construction, and robust standard errors will be required.
Data
The data set, courtesy of the Australian Bookmakers Association, includes near-complete erroneous data (for example, all horses having the same odds). Another 190 races were dropped because they included late scratches. 15 The remaining 5,017 observations were then matched with the races' total purse value where possible. 16 Because purse data were not available for all races, the final data set includes 4,661 observations. This contrasts favorably with the sample sizes employed by Shin (1993) and Cain et al. (2003) which respectively had 136 and a maximum of 1430 observations. Other than purse data being less available in Victoria than New South Wales and Queensland (82% vs. 97% and 98%), the race characteristics when purse was and was not observed are similar.
For each race, we observe the date, racetrack, size of field, ordinal placement of race (e.g., second of day), purse value, and the starting (i.e., final) odds on horses from the sampled bookie. The starting odds were used to calculate bettors' subjective probabilities, the bookmaker's takeout, and various measures of dispersion in the field (e.g., Gini coefficients, variance of subjective probabilities, entropy). While all dispersion measures yielded similar results, we will focus on the variance of the logged subjective probabilities (VarLP) as this is the best match to CM which we use for our later calibration exercise. We operationalize the race's ordinal placement by creating an indicator variable Late that equals 1 if the race is the eighth of the day or later. As late-day races are often the most publicized of the day, we found that this variable sufficiently captured that form of intraday variation. Finally, we include a week-based time trend over the sample to capture any secular changes in demand. We have no compelling explanation for the elevated Brisbane takeouts, though it seems likely to be related to anecdotal observations that Brisbane bettors are largely domestic Australians while Sydney and Melbourne tracks receive more wagering from potentially more price-sensitive southeast Asian bettors. There is substantial variation in takeouts across markets, but over four-fifths of the variation within markets occurs in races on the same day at the same track. To the extent that weather is relatively constant within a day, 15 Late scratches occur when horses drop out of races after bookmakers publish opening odds but prior to the start of the race. McAlvanah and Moul (2011) consider how this sort of late change to the field might lead to deviation from our profit-maximization assumption. 16 Purse values were obtained from Racing Information Services Australia (RISA), Racing New South Wales, and Queensland Racing. 17 CM do not restrict themselves to Saturday races, but they do limit their data set to races that pay out to four places. As the Kentucky Derby in 1994 paid out to five places, it was excluded from their sample. this strongly suggests that race characteristics play an important role in the takeouts that bookies set.
We deflate purse to 1994 US $ to facilitate comparisons with the Louisville data. 18 Races Table 3 displays the descriptive results and t-statistics when takeout is regressed on various race characteristics. These estimates should be interpreted as the equilibrium impact of the 18 The exchange rate in 1994 and 2002-07 was similar and relatively stable at US $0.74 to AU $1. We use US-CPI data to adjust for inflation. 19 The negative correlation between purse and takeout for the entire sample is primarily driven by the fact that Brisbane has low purses and high takeouts while Melbourne and Sydney have high purses and low takeouts. characteristic on bookie takeout. Given the widely differing levels of takeout across markets, we include market fixed effects for the full sample, and we also consider market-specific regressions. Preliminary estimates indicated an increasing and concave relationship between takeout and field size that was well accommodated by including field size in logs, and so we proceed using that transformation.
Results

Empirics
All estimates indicate that takeout falls with purse (though insignificant in the Sydney regression) and field dispersion (though insignificant in Brisbane regression) and rises with field size and being late in the day. The time trend polynomial estimates imply that takeout falls early in the sample, stabilizes and then falls again toward the sample's end, though these transition points vary across markets.
We highlight two points from these descriptive regressions. First, coefficients appear to differ enough across markets to warrant market-specific, rather than pooled, regressions going forward. Second, with the exception of the negative impact of purse on takeout, these results are largely consistent with the extant literature. CM find on-site pari-mutuel handle to be increasing in field size and decreasing in field dispersion. As stated above, Shin (1993) and the related papers have already documented the positive relationship between field size and takeout. The purse coefficient, however, stands out. In addition to being counterintuitive, it appears to contradict our primary purpose for its inclusion, namely that it serves as a proxy for unobserved (to the econometrician) ex ante race quality. It is this apparent paradox and the potential resolution proposed by Nevo and Hatzitaskos (2005) that motivates our particular structural model and its reduced form.
We display our estimates for the reduced form model in Table 4 . As discussed above, our maintained hypothesis is that the observed bookie is part of a bookmaker-cartel, and so our linear demand implies that the observed takeout is simply one-half of the market demand's vertical intercept (i.e., choke price). 20 The prior descriptive regressions are merely special cases of the reduced form in which  = 0 for all variables. The nonlinear least squares estimates for Brisbane and Melbourne reconcile our prior expectations and purse's descriptive impact on demand. In both markets, increases in purse shift demand outward but also increase price sensitivity. Melbourne's estimates especially showcase the value of the reduced form model. Those estimates show that, while purse's net impact is a combination of countervailing forces (outward shift and more price sensitive), field size's net impact is a combination of two forces working in the same direction (outward shift and less price sensitive). While not shown, when    is set to zero in the Brisbane regression,    is positive and highly significant (t-stat ≈ 16).
Estimates using Sydney races, though, are less satisfactory. While not significant, estimates indicate that increasing purse shifts demand inward and makes bettors less price sensitive. The latter results could be rationalized, but the former runs counter to both intuition and the results of CM. It is unclear why our model would accommodate Melbourne so
readily and yet struggle with Sydney, even though they both represent high-visibility, highquality gambling markets. For our purposes, these results imply that a representative bettor inferred from Sydney bookie takeouts will be irreconcilable with our Louisville situation. We therefore focus our calibration exercises on the Brisbane and Melbourne estimates.
Calibration exercise
We begin by inferring the price-disutility parameter  from Louisville's observed population, sample means from CM, the Kentucky-specific own-take elasticity of Thalheimer and Ali (1998), and the -parameters of our reduced form model after deflating purses to 1994 USD.
The linearity of our structural model implies that own-take elasticity (evaluated at sample means) is
so  is calibrated as
In addition to the estimates from Table 4 , we use a 1994 Louisville population of 676,404, Thalheimer and Ali's estimate of  = -1.85, the state takeout for win bets of 0.16, and sample means as found in Table 1. 21 Table 5 displays the  parameter values that result when using the Brisbane and Melbourne reduced form estimates (3.24 and 3.36, respectively). Given the small Louisville sample means and comparable estimates of , it is not surprising that the markets' implied s are so similar. We then use each value for  to compute per capita handle for each of our observed races. Results suggest that Melbourne's per capita money wagered is about double that of Louisville and that Brisbane's is even greater. This is consistent with other data showing Australians' pronounced propensity to gamble, even compared to a U.S. city where wagering is relatively easy. Interacting these per capita values with the city populations using on-track bookies yields the average amount wagered with bookies each race.
Multiplying those aggregate amounts by the implied takeout gives a measure of aggregate cumulative takeout (variable profit) by race. To the extent that bookies fail to achieve our profit-maximizing ideal, this figure is an overstatement, but it may also be understated as bookies capture rents on bets well before racetime. We then compute a rough measure of per-bookie variable profit by dividing this aggregate figure by the typical number of bookies, Our recovered structural parameters also enable us to consider how their implied impacts compare to the elasticity estimates of CM. Levels and elasticities are interesting side-tests, but our primary concern is the predicted impact of allowing a U.S. pari-mutuel racetrack the flexibility to vary its takeout across races. 22 We address this by considering the converse question of what would happen if our bookmaker cartel were restricted to charge the fixed profit-maximizing takeout 22 These percentage impacts are therefore generally robust to any proportional overstatements that the prior figures may display.
We compare the outcomes under this counterfactual to the previously inferred outcomes under perfectly variable takeouts. The implication of these results is then the change that would result if constant pari-mutuel takeouts were already set at the unit-elastic level.
Our first counterfactual considers the comparison between all tracks in a market facing a common fixed takeout, and the second considers the case of when each track may have its own fixed takeout. Consistent with Schmalensee (1981) , moving from a fixed to variable takeout in either market raises cumulative takeout, substantially decreases consumer surplus, and marginally decreases welfare. 23 There appears to be minimal heterogeneity across racetracks that would lead to markedly different outcomes under the two counterfactual scenarios.
Brisbane impacts are uniformly smaller (in absolute value) than Melbourne's, and, given our prior arguments, we will focus on the Brisbane predictions. Allowing flexible takeouts raises cumulative takeout by 3%, lowers consumer surplus by over 8%, and lowers welfare by 1%.
To put those figures into context, the Thalheimer and Ali (1998) elasticity estimate of -1.85
implies that dropping Kentucky's takeout for win bets from 16% to 14% would raise handle by 23.1% and cumulative takeout by 7.7%.
Similar to other states, the state of Kentucky levies an excise tax on handle on live races of 3.5% (1.5%) for large (small) tracks, where $1.2M of daily average handle is the sizethreshold (KRS 138.510). Our linear functional form implies that moving from a fixed to variable takeout will have no impact on cumulative handle, and so the current excise tax regime would yield no gains to the state from a reform that increases takeout flexibility.
If, however, Kentucky were to tax cumulative takeout instead of handle, then some of the gains would go to the state government where they could displace or prevent other taxes with higher negative welfare consequences. Given the presently fixed takeouts, this change is largely semantic, in that the 3.5% excise tax on a large track's money wagered is equivalent to a 21.875% tax on cumulative takeout on simple win/place/show bets.
Conclusions
While bookies have no role in pari-mutuel wagering in the U.S., we have provided a model to link our Australian estimates to potential reforms of the American horse racing industry.
Our estimates highlight the value of the incorporation of theory into empirical work and also provide more support for the idea that many observations that appear paradoxical within a 23 Our linear functional form implies that moving from a fixed to variable takeout will have no impact on handle.
model of perfect competition can be readily reconciled in a model that allows market power.
Finally, our estimates give some idea of the impacts that would follow reform that grant racetracks flexibility in setting takeouts.
Economists are broadly interested in cases when deregulation might improve welfare, and pari-mutuel wagers on horse racing, while a small industry, illustrates how cross-country study may provide critical empirical variation to achieve answers to relevant questions. Given the possibility that proposed flexibility would lower consumer surplus and even welfare, we hesitate to advocate too strongly for it. Nevertheless, the American horse racing industry is in a sufficiently parlous state that a proposal that may increase track profits and viability as well as government coffers without reducing welfare is worth some consideration. Table 3 . VarLP parameter is hemi-elasticity.
